The same is true of such policies as affirmative action, long
supported by major universities and corporations as well as by the
federal government. In Grutter v. Bollinger, the 2003 Supreme Court
ruling that upheld the University of Michigan law school's affirmative
action policies, 65 corporations filed amicus curiae briefs endorsing the
school's admission policies that discriminate against white applicants.¹
The 1991 Civil Rights Act, a major intensification of affirmative action
enforced by the federal government, was also endorsed by large cor-
porations. Not only corporations but also and even more obviously
the major political leaders of the country and the major cultural voices
either explicitly approve of affirmative action and denounce anyone
who opposes it, or refuse to resist or question it.

Similarly, most of the leading authorities in the United States--
what is popularly called the "Establishment," including political,
media, academic, and business leadership circles--oppose publicly dis-
playing or honoring the Confederate flag and other symbols of the
white American heritage (the Custer battlefield at Little Big Horn,
the celebration of Columbus Day, the playing of "Dixie," etc.) and
support non-white demands for the removal or transformation of such
symbols. Large businesses, foundations, and universities are in the
forefront of mandatory "sensitivity training," multiculturalist indoc-
trination, and efforts to portray white racial and cultural identity as
a source of pathology, extremism, repression, and violence, and to
instill feelings of guilt for white, European, Christian civilization and
achievements. Some years ago the Budweiser company sponsored a
series of advertisements that helped popularize and legitimize various
myths of Afrocentric propaganda, such as the claims that the Semitic
Carthaginian general Hannibal, various kings of ancient Egypt, and the
last Macedonian queen of Egypt, Cleopatra, were all Negroes--claims
known to be preposterously contrary to historical fact. No company
of that scale in recent times has ever sponsored analogous ads glorify-
ing the Confederacy or the white exploration and conquest of North
America or white contributions to science, scholarship, and letters or
any other achievement of whites, even by means of more or less accurate
history, let alone by outright lies. In 2000, Wal-Mart and most other
large corporate food chains ceased selling a barbecue sauce locally
manufactured by South Carolina businessman Maurice Bessinger,
on the grounds that Mr. Bessinger's restaurant in Columbia, South
Carolina displayed the Confederate flag and distributed pamphlets
that supposedly justified Southern slavery. Spokesmen for Wal-Mart
claimed that Mr. Bessinger's sauce was dropped because their chain
did "not condone slavery in any way"--although at the same time,
as Business Week (October 2, 2000) disclosed, Wal-Mart was selling
women's apparel known to have been manufactured by slave labor in
Communist China.

One could continue indefinitely the catalogue of how large corpora-
tions and their executives, the federal and larger state and urban govern-
ments and their leaders, and the major academic, intellectual, artistic,
entertainment, publishing, and journalistic institutions and personali-
ties--the dominant culture of the United States--consistently support
anti-white causes and promote the myths, claims, and interests of non-
whites at the expense of whites.

The conventional accusation against the American Establishment
from the political left is that it is "racist" and fosters "white supremacy"
in order to perpetuate the domination and exploitation of the non-
white peoples of this country and the world by the largely white ruling
class. That accusation is so brazenly contrary to the anti-white policies,
rhetoric, and behavior in which the most powerful forces in American
society consistently engage that it withstands little scrutiny. By playing
on the guilt and fear of establishment leaders, both of which reflect these
leaders' shared acceptance of the left's egalitarian values, it is an accusa-
tion that serves mainly to push the establishment ever further and faster
down the anti-white path than it is normally inclined to go. Fixated on a
nineteenth century model of "capitalism," the Marxism from which this
accusation derives has managed to miss the realities of twentieth and
twenty-first century power that do in fact explain what must be one of
the most significant and astonishing truths of human history--that an
entire ruling class has abandoned and in effect declared war upon the
very population and civilization from which it is itself drawn.

If Marxist theories offer no explanation of the antagonism of the
American Establishment to white racial identity, neither does conven-
tional democratic political thought. Mass immigration, affirmative
action policies, blatant discrimination against white identity and those
who defend it, multiculturalism in education, anti-white brainwash-
ing in sensitivity training, support for non-white (and often anti-white)
political and cultural causes, and other manifestations of entrenched
antagonism to whites are not the results of democratic majority rule
or popular consent. At best, whites accept or "consent to" these
onslaughts against them, their material interests, their heritage, and
their own psychic identity and integrity because "consent" has been
subtly manufactured and shaped by the institutions of the dominant
culture. Not a single one of the measures that threaten whites has origi-
nated among whites themselves at the popular or grassroots level. Each
and every one-mass immigration, the forced busing of the 1970s, the
civil rights rulings of the federal courts from the 1950s through today,
the affirmative action invented by invisible bureaucrats and upheld by
unaccountable courts, the mind control measures that now permeate
our schools, workplaces, and media, and the systematic repression and
exclusion of those who question or challenge these trends--has origi-
nated from and has been imposed and enforced by elites.

Nor does racial blackmail, frequently cited as the reason elites so
often collaborate in anti-white policies, offer an adequate explanation.
While racial extortionists like Jesse Jackson, the NAACP, and various
Hispanic lobbies threaten denunciations of "racism," anti-discrimina-
tion lawsuits, demonstrations, boycotts, etc. against institutions that fail
to submit to their demands and complaints, the institutions they target
possess immense financial resources, legal talents, and political and
public relations influence themselves--yet they do virtually nothing to
defend themselves against such attacks and support virtually no efforts
to counter the legal, political, and cultural conditions that allow the
attacks to succeed. It is unlikely that racial blackmail could work as
well as it usually seems to do unless its victims were already willing to
surrender to it or already inclined to accept its assumptions of guilt.

Neither Marxism nor the democratic theory embraced nowadays by
both "liberals" and "conservatives" is therefore of much use in under-
standing why the dominant elites of American and Western society
behave as they do. The model that does help explain their behavior
derives from what is usually called the "classical theory of elites,"
developed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries by a school of
Italian and German sociologists and political scientists, and from the
application of that model to twentieth century America, the theory of
the managerial revolution as developed by James Burnham.

The Classical Theory of Elites

The classical theory of elites was formulated principally by the
social and political theorists Vilfredo Pareto and Gaetano Mosca. It
holds that all human societies, at least all above the primitive level, are
ruled by organized minorities ("elites" or "ruling classes"), that the
majority in any society, even so-called democratic ones, never rules, and
that these organized minorities develop out of social-political groups
that control what are known as "social forces." The term "social force"
is an admittedly vague concept that can include virtually any idea,
technique, or institution that exerts social importance--a religion, an
ideology, a technology, a weapons system, control of natural resources,
etc. As Arthur Livingston, editor of Mosca's classic work, The Ruling
Class, explains:

A "social force" is any human activity or perquisite that has
a social significance--money, land, military prowess, religion,
education, manual labor, science--anything. The concept
derives from the necessity of defining and classifying ruling
classes. A man rules or a group of men rules when the man or
the group is able to control the social forces that, at the given
moment in the given society, are essential to the possession
and retention of power.²

What may be a significant social force in one historical epoch may
be an insignificant one in others--for example, the religion of Mithraism
in the ancient Roman Empire, which for a time rivaled Christianity but
eventually lost out and ceased to be important, or the control of the tech-
nology of producing and using iron weapons in the second millennium
B.C., which had not been a significant force prior to its invention but
became and remained a power-yielding technology around which domi-
nating social groups and conquering societies centered for thousands of
years afterwards.

If a social force is efficient at wielding power or control over other
people, then the group that controls the social force and other groups
with which it is allied will constitute a "ruling class" (Mosca's term) or
"elite" (Pareto's term), and classical elite theory assumes that normally
a ruling class or elite will exercise power mainly for its own benefits
and in its own interests. It should be understood that the control of "the
state" or the formal apparatus of government is only one means and the
state itself only one instrument by which a ruling class exercises power,
and the extent to which a particular ruling class will rely on the state
depends on its interests and the kinds of social forces it controls. It will
also make use of economic and cultural power based on its control of
economic forces, or what Marx called the "instruments of production
and exchange" (land, capital, technology, industrial plants, commerce,
financial institutions, etc.), as well as cultural forces that essentially
regulate the production and dissemination of information, values, and
ideas within a society (in pre-modern societies, this means principally
religion, but also the production of art, literature, music, scholarship,
science, and entertainment through publishing, education, journalism,
broadcasting, film, etc.). The power of a ruling class or elite is therefore
not merely political power in the narrow sense of control of the formal
state, elected and appointive offices, the administrative agencies, and the
instruments of force (the armed forces and law enforcement services) but
is structural--imbedded in the structure of the society it rules. A ruling
class will usually tend to rely on one or another particular segment of
the social structure--the state, the economy, or the culture--for holding
and exercising power, but those segments are never entirely separate
and the particular ones on which it tends to rely will depend on its own
interests and beliefs as well as on the level of technological and social
development of the society and on the kinds of challenges, problems,
and enemies it encounters.

In the process of acquiring and exercising power, the ruling class
will reshape the society and culture it dominates in order to buttress,
defend, and justify (or "rationalize") its dominance, and the reshaping
will reflect what the elite perceives as its group interests. It carries out
the reshaping of society first by defining and imposing an ideology, or
what Mosca called a "political formula," that justifies its power as right
or natural or inevitable. "Ruling classes," Mosca wrote,

do not justify their power exclusively by de facto possession
of it, but try to find a moral and legal basis for it, representing
it as the logical and necessary consequence of doctrines and
beliefs that are generally recognized and accepted.³

The ideology or political formula is imbedded in and imposed on
the subject society by means of the cultural institutions the ruling class
creates and controls, and the articulation and defense of the formula is
the main purpose of the culture with respect to the ruling class. But, as
Mosca and Pareto both acknowledged, elites typically "really believe
in" the ideologies and formulas they espouse. Political formulas are not,
Mosca insists, "mere quackeries aptly invented to trick the masses into
obedience. Anyone who viewed them in that light would fall into grave
error."

The truth is that they answer a real need in man's social nature;
and this need, so universally felt, of governing and knowing
that one is governed not on the basis of mere material or
intellectual force, but on the basis of a moral principle, has
beyond any doubt a practical and a real importance.⁴

One of the major differences between the theory of elites and simple-
minded conspiracy theories is that the latter almost always postulate
hidden groups of conspirators who do not believe in the ideas they use
to gull and manipulate the masses. In elite theory, political formulas
tend to become ideologies that take on a life of their own and push
behavior of their own accord, without conscious or deliberate fraud or
calculation of interests by those who accept them.

The theory of elites as formulated by Mosca and Pareto can easily be
illustrated by the example of medieval and early modern European and
British society. In that society, political, economic, and cultural power was
largely in the hands of the feudal and post-feudal aristocracies that con-
trolled the land, which yielded both economic wealth and political and
military power through the system of feudalism and institutions derived
from feudalism. The power of the European and British aristocracies
of this era, from the Middle Ages down to the Industrial Revolution,
was mainly based on control of the land, its agricultural wealth, and the
cultural and political system that reflected and supported landed power.

The dominant ideology or "political formula" of the period was
expressed in the doctrine of what was later called the "Great Chain of
Being," a theory of the universe that derived from Plato and justified
hierarchy both in nature and society. It is found throughout the literature
and thought of the era.⁵ Only when the social force of land ownership
and the wealth and power it produced was displaced by the rise of a
different social force in the form of industrially and commercially based
wealth and power in the nineteenth century did the older aristocracies of
Europe and Britain begin to decline and be replaced by a new elite, based
on industrial, commercial, and financial wealth.

It is a basic tenet of the classical theory of elites that all human societies
have elites, that there is really no such thing as political or social equality
or "consent of the governed," and that what is called "democracy" in any
literal sense is largely an illusion. As James Burnham wrote in describing
the role of elites and ruling classes in human society:

From the point of view of the theory of the ruling class, a
society is the society of its ruling class. A nation's strength or
weakness, its culture, its powers of endurance, its prosperity,
its decadence, depend in the first instance upon the nature of
its ruling class. More particularly, the way in which to study
a nation, to understand it, to predict what will happen to it,
requires first of all and primarily an analysis of the ruling
class. Political history and political science are thus predomi-
nantly the history and science of ruling classes, their origin,
development, composition, structure, and changes.⁶

Political scientist James Meisel argued that an elite must exhibit what
he called the "Three C's: Consciousness, Coherence, and Conspiracy."
This is a helpful but also perhaps confusing formula, especially its third
term. He meant that all the "members of an elite are alert to their group
interest or interests; that this alertness is in turn caused or affected by a
sense, implicit or explicit, of group or class solidarity; and last, that this
solidarity is expressed in a common will to action." ⁷ These traits may
be said to establish the common identity and unity of the elite or ruling
class, but the elite must not only be "alert" to its interests as a group and
conscious of itself as a group, but also able to make its interests prevail
over those of other, competing groups--i.e., to possess actual power. In
other words, the two essential characteristics of an elite/ruling class are
what may be called Unity and Dominance-unity in that it needs to
cohere around its interests and to agree on what its interests are and (in
general) how to pursue them, and dominance in that it must be able to
make its interests prevail over those of rival groups.

Many social theorists in the Western world today argue that the
kind of unitary ruling class that Mosca and Pareto described is no longer
really possible in the kind of advanced industrialized society that prevails
in the West and that there are too many competing power centers for
unitary elites like the old British and European aristocracies to develop
and endure. These theorists mainly support the idea of what they call
"strategic elites," a number of different elites within the same society that
may control power in certain domains but actually compete with and
against each other and through their conflict create what is essentially
political freedom. Thus, elites in such institutions as corporations, unions,
and government exist but are said to be largely separate and distinct and
supposedly compete against each othei as do the different political parties
and their elites, as well as other institutions in the economy, politics, and
the culture.⁸ However, while there are obvious structural differences
between contemporary elites today and those of pre-industrial societies,
this version of elite theory, often called the "pluralist model," tends to
exaggerate the differences among the "strategic elites" and the degree to
which they compete or conflict with each other. It also tends to minimize
the similarities among "strategic elites" and the common interests they
share in excluding from power any groups or social forces with antagonis-
tic interests, ideologies, and agendas. In other words, in my view, the basic
error of the "pluralist," or "strategic elite," school is that it underestimates
the unity of the American ruling class. Remarks such as George Wallace's
line in 1968 that "there's not a dime's worth of difference" between the
Republican and Democratic Parties, the term "Republicrat" as a colloqui-
alism for the indistinguishability of the two parties, and the wisecrack that
what American politics needs is not a "third party" but a second party all
reflect the perception among the politically alienated of the essential unity
of the two major political vehicles of the American ruling class.

Moreover, classical elite theory does not deny that different groups
and sections within a unitary ruling class can disagree, compete, or conflict
with each other, sometimes even to the point of waging civil war. The
English Wars of the Roses of the fifteenth century, the English Civil War of
the seventeenth century, and indeed the American War for Independence
of the late eighteenth century are all instances of violent conflicts that
originated and largely remained within the elites of the day. Such conflicts
occur when different sections of a unified ruling class come to disagree on
what their interests are or on how to pursue them, with the result of social
breakdown and internal war.

Although most mainstream social scientists in the United States
today would not endorse it, classical elite theory is useful in answering
the question "who rules America," and its main application to American
society, the theory of the managerial revolution as developed by James
Burnham, was concerned to deal with that very question.

The Theory of the Managerial Revolution

Emerging from Marxism in the late 1930s, Burnham formulated
the theory of the managerial revolution as an alternative to the Marxist
claim that a "capitalist" ruling class held power in the United States
and would soon be displaced by a proletarian revolution along Marxist
lines. Although Burnham agreed with the Marxists that traditional cap-
italism and its ruling class were dying and were on the eve of being
displaced by a social revolution, he rejected the Marxist claim that the
society of the future would be the egalitarian socialism the Marxists
predicted. Instead, he argued, the capitalist elite would be replaced by
another elite, which he called the "managerial class."

A "manager," in Burnham's sense, is not simply someone who runs
or operates an institution on behalf of its owners, which is the sense
in which the word is often used today (e.g., the manager of a chain
restaurant), nor did he confine the term to what is today usually called
"corporate management." Using the hypothetical example of an auto-
mobile company, Burnham held that

Certain individuals--the operating executives, production
managers, plant superintendents, and their associates--have
charge of the actual technical process of producing. It is their
job to organize the materials, tools, machines, plant facili-
ties, equipment, and labor in such a way as to turn out the
automobiles. These are the individuals whom I call "the
managers." ⁹

Technicality, indeed, was the hallmark of the managerial function,
and the increase in the technicality of production was the sociological
basis of the managerial revolution in the economic organizations of the
twentieth century.

There is a combined shift: through changes in the technique
of production, the functions of management become more
distinctive, more complex, more specialized, and more crucial
to the whole process of production, thus serving to set off
those who perform these functions as a separate group or class
in society; and at the same time those who formerly carried
out what functions there were of management, the bourgeoi-
sie [i.e., the old capitalist elitel, themselves withdraw from
management, so that the difference in function becomes also
a difference in the individuals who carry out the function.¹⁰

A "manager" in Burnham's sense, therefore, is essentially what we
would today call a technocrat, someone who uses technical, specialized
skills to control and direct an institution, whether or not he actually
owns or has a legal right to the possession of the institution. One reason
Burnham did not use the term "technocrat" to describe what he meant
was that, in the period when he was writing, that word (usually cap-
italized) already referred to a specific social-political movement (one
associated with Howard Scott), though Burnham acknowledged that
"the society about which the Technocrats write is quite obviously [a]
managerial society, and within it their `Technocrats' are quite obviously
the managerial ruling class." ¹¹

As Burnham used the term "manager," it included "administrators,
experts, directing engineers, production executives, propaganda spe-
cialists, technocrats" and in general those who possessed the technical
skills by which the institutions and organizations of modern society
are operated or "managed"--not only the large corporations of the
economy but also the increasingly massive governments and political
and cultural organizations of the twentieth century: public bureaucra-
cies, mass labor unions, political parties, mass media, financial insti-
tutions, universities, foundations, and other organizations that were
immense in size, scale, and technical complexity and dwarfed their insti-
tutional ancestors of the declining capitalist era. "Management" in the
sense of the body of technical and managerial skills that enabled these
large, complex organizations to exist and function constituted a "social
force," control of which enabled the formation of a new elite.

These mass organizations are far more powerful with respect to
society than most of the older, smaller scale, and simpler ones, and
within them, managers possess the real power because only they possess
the skills by which the new mass organizations can be directed and
operated. With respect to corporations in the economy, the stockown-
ers, no matter how concentrated their ownership of company stock
may be, simply do not and cannot perform the necessary managerial
and technical functions on which the corporation depends, unless they
make a special effort to acquire the needed managerial skills through
education and training, and not all that many stockowners from the old
capitalist upper class do so. As business historian Alfred D. Chandler, Jr.,
who substantiated much of Burnham's analysis of modern managerial
corporations, writes, although "wealthy families.. .are the beneficiaries
of managerial capitalism," there is "little evidence that these families
make basic decisions concerning the operations of modern capitalistic
enterprises and of the economy in which they operate," and "members
of the entrepreneurial family rarely became active in top management
unless they themselves were trained as professional managers." ¹² As
historian Geoffrey Barraclough described the emergence of these new
forces in the economy:

The new industrial techniques, unlike the old, necessitated
the creation of large-scale undertakings and the concentra-
tion of the population in vast urban agglomerations.... The
small-scale family businesses, which were typical of the first
phase of industrialism, [did not possess] the means to finance
the installation of new, more complicated and more expensive
machinery [or indeed the skills to manage it on the necessary
scale].¹³

But the managers are by no means confined to the corporate elite;
those possessing technical and managerial skills are also dominant
within the state itself as the managerial bureaucracy and the mass
cultural institutions, and thus they become an increasingly unified and
dominant class, relying on the same managerial skills and sharing a
common perceived interest and a common mentality, worldview, and
ideology.

The major common interest that unites the managerial class is its
need to extend and perpetuate the demand for the skills and functions
on which its power and social rewards depend. The managers pursue
that interest by seeking to ensure that the mass organizations they
control, which require the skills and functions that only the managers
can provide, are preserved and extended. Large corporations must
displace and dominate small businesses. A large, centralized, bureau-
cratic state must displace and dominate small, localized, and decentral-
ized government. Mass media and communications conglomerates and
mass universities must displace and dominate smaller, local newspapers,
publishers, colleges, and schools. Moreover, the elites that controlled
these older and smaller institutions must also be displaced as the ruling
class of the larger society and their ideology and cultural values discred-
ited and rejected.

The managerial revolution therefore consists in the protracted
social and political process by which the emerging new manage-
rial class displaces the old ruling class of traditional capitalist or
bourgeois society. On the institutional level this process consists of
the replacement of the constitutionalist parliamentary or congres-
sional form of government favored by the old elite with the new
centralized state controlled by the bureaucracy of the new class. The
new kind of state that emerges takes on new functions that increas-
ingly require the kind of skills only the managerial bureaucrats and
technocrats can provide--economic regulation, social engineering.
public welfare, and scientific, administrative, and cultural functions
unknown to the older states of the capitalist era. The political elite
of the older state--the political class that dominated the elected and
appointed offices and their political organizations--is increasingly
displaced by the managerial bureaucrats of the new state and the
political managers who run the new, far more complicated political
parties and organizations. The same kind of institutional displace-
ment occurs in the economy dominated by the mass corporations,
which also take on functions unknown to the smaller (or even the
larger) firms of the earlier era--"scientific management" of produc-
tion, highly technical economic projections and development, spe-
cialized management of personnel and consumers, as well as social,
political, and cultural functions not directly related to their business
activities and interests. And much the same process takes place in
cultural institutions as mass cultural organizations (universities,
foundations, "think tanks") and mass circulation newspapers and
magazines displace smaller, locally owned and operated ones and
new, nationally organized, highly technical mass media like film and
radio and television broadcasting develop.

On the cultural and ideological level the struggle between the
ascending managerial ruling class and the declining bourgeois-capital-
ist class has taken the form of the conflict between what emerged as
the principal managerial ideology in the United States and the Western
world, which has generally come to be known as "liberalism," and
the main ideology of the old capitalist elite, which came to be known
as "conservatism." The political fulfillment of the managerial revolu-
tion occurred in the early twentieth century, with a strong start under
Woodrow Wilson but really culminating under Franklin Roosevelt in
the New Deal and World War II era, and the struggle for social power
between the new managerial liberalism and the old capitalist conserva-
tism is evident in the political and cultural literature of the mid-century.
The advertisements carried by virtually all conservative or right-wing
magazines of the 1950s and 1960s were almost always from smaller,
locally based, and individually owned and operated enterprises. The ads
carried by the liberal or what soon became the "mainstream" magazines
of the era were almost always from the Fortune 500 or similar large.
managerially controlled companies.

The conservatism of that era emphasized states rights, the power
of Congress over that of the presidency, loyalty to and identity with
the nation and national interest rather than international or global
identities, and the interests of smaller, privately owned and operated
companies against larger, managerially controlled corporations. It also
championed traditional religious and moral beliefs and institutions,
the importance of the patriarchal family and local community, and the
value of national, regional, racial, and ethnic identity, as well as the
virtues of the capitalist ethic--hard work, frugality, personal honesty
and integrity, individual initiative, postponement of gratification.

It is quite true that most businessmen, including the big business-
men of the rising managerial corporations, opposed the New Deal and
hated Franklin Roosevelt intensely, but there were also a good many big
businessmen even in the New Deal era who supported Roosevelt and the
New Deal. Political scientist Thomas Ferguson has identified a section
of American business interests that was supportive of the New Deal and
the reforms it brought about. This "multinational bloc," as Ferguson calls
it, was the core of the emerging managerial elite within the large corpo-
rations. It favored lower tariffs, American economic aid to Europe, and
conciliation of organized labor; it included capital-intensive rather than
labor-intensive industries, companies such as Standard Oil of New Jersey
and General Electric that depended on trade with European markets, and
international banks. The corporations that composed this "new bloc"
were in the vanguard of managerial capitalism and the construction of
managerial hegemony:

The newer bloc included many of the largest, most rapidly
growing corporations in the economy. Recognized industry
leaders with the most sophisticated managements, these
concerns embodied the norms of professionalism and sci-
entific advance that in this period fired the imagination of
large parts of American society. The largest of them also
dominated major American foundations, which were coming
to exercise major influence not only on the climate of opinion
but on the specific content of American public policy. And,
what might be termed the "multinational liberalism" of the
internationalists was also aided significantly by the spread of
liberal Protestantism; by a newspaper stratification process
that brought the free trade organ of international finance,
the New York Times, to the top; by the growth of capital-
intensive network radio in the dominant Eastern, interna-
tionally oriented environment; and by the rise of major news
magazines.¹⁴

Policy experts, lawyers, and managers associated with this "bloc"
supported and strongly influenced such New Deal reform measures as
the Social Security Act, the National Recovery Act, the Wagner Act, free
trade policies, and the Glass-Steagall Act.

Like any new elite, the managerial class needed a political formula
that expressed and justified its group interests against those of its older
rivals in the capitalist elite. What has come to be known as "liberalism"
performed that function for the new class, although it has been known
under other names as well ("modernism," "progressivism," "humanism,"
and what Burnham himself called simply "New Dealism").¹⁵ Managerial
liberalism justified the enlargement and centralization of the state under
executive rather than congressional leadership, the primacy of the central
rather than state and local government, regulation of the economy by the
central state, a foreign policy of global interventionism and international
organization rather than the nationalism and isolationism favored by
the older capitalist class, and the development of a new culture that
claimed to be more "progressive," more "liberated," more "humanis-
tic," and more "scientific" and "rational" than the culture defined by
the older social and moral codes of traditional capitalism. The mana-
gerial ideology also demonized the old elite and its institutions and
values as "obsolete," "backward," "repressive," "exploitative," and
"narrow-minded."

There was therefore an increasingly significant cultural and ideo-
logical schism between the new elite and the old and their respective
adherents. The old elite was more or less rooted in traditional social
institutions, which both served its material interests and reflected its
formulas and values. It passed on its property and wealth, the basis
of its power, through inheritance, and therefore it had a strong vested
interest in maintaining both property rights and what are today called
"family values." The family indeed, as well as the local community,
religious and ethnic identities, and the cultural and moral codes that
respected and legitimized property, wealth, inheritance, social continu-
ity, the personal virtues that helped people acquire wealth and property,
and small governments that lacked the power to threaten these things.
all served as power bases for the traditional elite and as major cultural
and ideological supports for its interests.

The Managerial Disengagement

This was not the case with the new managerial elites. Depending on
the technical skills that enable it to gain and keep power inside mass
organizations, the new elite possesses a major structural interest in pre-
serving and extending the organizations it controls and in making sure
those organizations are perpetuated. The moral and social bonds of the
old elite mean virtually nothing to managers, who are unable to pass
on their professional skills to their children in the way that the progeny
of the old elite inherited property and position. Hence, managers tend
to depend on families far less than the older elite and therefore to value
the family and the moral codes that reflect and reinforce it far less also.
The culture the managers seek to build places more value on individual
achievement and "merit" (defined largely as the ability to acquire and
exercise managerial and technical skills) than on family inheritance, on
sexual fulfillment than postponement of gratification and the breeding
and rearing of children, on social mobility and advancement rather than
identification with family, community, race, and nation.

But in addition to the family, the managerial class simply does not
need other traditional institutional structures to maintain its power--
not the local community, not religion, not traditional cultural and
moral codes, not ethnic and racial identities, and not even the nation-
state itself. Indeed, such institutions merely get in the way of manage-
rial power. They represent barriers against which the managerial state,
corporations, and other mass organizations are always bumping, and
the sooner such barriers are leveled, the more reach and power the
organizations, and the managerial elites that run them, will acquire.
Corporations depending on mass production and mass consumption
need a mass market with uniform tastes, values, and living standards
that will buy what consumers are told to buy; diverse local, regional,
class, and ethnic identities impede the required degree of uniformity.
The same is true for the state and the mass obedience it requires and
seeks to instill into the population it governs and for the mass cultural
organizations and the audiences they manipulate.¹⁶ Journalist David
Rieff has pointed to the similarities in interests and worldview between
"noted multiculturalist academics," supposedly on the political left,
on the one hand, and corporate officers, supposedly on the political
right, on the other:

Far from standing in implacable intellectual opposition to
each other, both groups see the same racial and gender trans-
formations in the demographic makeup of the United States
and of the American work force. That non-white workers
will be the key to the twenty-first-century American labor
market is a given in most sensible long-range corporate
plans. Like the multiculturalists, the business elite is similarly
aware of the crucial role of women, and of the need to
change the workplace in such a way as to make it more
hospitable to them. More generally, both CEOs and Ph.D.'s
insist more and more that it is no longer possible to speak
in terms of the United States as some fixed, sovereign entity.
The world has moved on; capital and labor are mobile; and
with each passing year national borders, not to speak of
national identities, become less relevant to consciousness or
to commerce.¹⁷

In the 1970s, Zbigniew Brzezinski noted the emergence of what he
called "transnational elites" throughout the developed world:

Today we are again witnessing the emergence of transna-
tional elites, but now they are composed of international
businessmen, scholars, professional men, and public officials.
The ties of these new elites cut across national boundaries,
their perspectives are not confined by national traditions,
and their interests are more functional than national.... The
creation of the global information grid, facilitating almost
continuous intellectual interaction and the pooling of
knowledge, will further enhance the present trend toward
international professional elites and toward the emergence
of a common scientific language.... This, however, could
create a dangerous gap between them and the politically
activated masses, whose "nativism"--exploited by more
nationalist political leaders--could work against the "cos-
mopolitan" elites.¹⁸

The late Christopher Lasch made a similar point about the "mana-
gerial and professional elites," though he denied that these elites consti-
tuted "a new ruling class":

Their fortunes are tied to enterprises that operate across
national boundaries. They are more concerned with the smooth
functioning of the system as a whole than with any of its parts.
Their loyalties--if the term is not itself anachronistic in this
context--are international rather than regional, national, or
local. They have more in common with their counterparts in
Brussels or Hong Kong than with the masses of Americans not
yet plugged into the network of global communications.¹⁹

And most recently Samuel P. Huntington has discussed and docu-
mented in some detail the "denationalization of the elites" into what
he calls "Dead Souls" who "abandon commitment to their nation and
their fellow citizens and argue the moral superiority of identifying with
humanity at large," a trend distinctive of economic elites with a strong
material interest in economic globalization as well as of academic and
intellectual elites:

Involvement in transnational institutions, networks, and
activities not only defines the global elite but also is critical to
achieving elite status within nations. Someone whose loyalties,
identities, involvements are purely national is less likely to rise
to the top in business, academia, the media, the professions,
than someone who transcends these limits. Outside politics,
those who stay home stay behind.²⁰

Long before these writers, however, Burnham himself was quite
specific about what he called the "world policy of the managers," their
rejection of the sovereign nation-states that had prevailed in the capitalist
era as obsolete units that were simply obstacles to their group interests
and the needs of the global order they sought to create.

The complex division of labor, the flow of trade and raw
materials made possible and demanded by modern technol-
ogy, were strangled in the network of diverse tariffs, laws,
currencies, passports, boundary restrictions, bureaucracies,
and independent armies. It has been clear for some while that
these were going to be smashed; the only problem was who
was going to do it and when.²¹

Hence, the managers will seek to replace sovereign nation-states with
new imperial or transnational states (Burnham saw National Socialist
Germany, Imperial Japan, and the New Deal United States--mistakenly
in the case of the first two--as the "nuclei" of the three managerial
"super-states" of the future), and

Everywhere, men will have to line up with one or the other
of the super-states of tomorrow. There will not be room for
smaller sovereign nations; nor will the less advanced peoples
be able to stand up against the might of the metropolitan
areas. Of course, polite fictions of independence may be
preserved for propaganda purposes; but it is the reality and
not the name of sovereignty about which we are talking.²²

Just as the managerial ruling class rejects independent nationhood
and national sovereignty as organizational forms, so it will also reject
ideologies such as nationalism that justify and reflect national sover-
eignty, independence, and identity, as well as any ideology or belief that
justifies any particular group identity and loyalty--national, regional,
racial, ethnic, cultural, or religious. The managerial class therefore tends
to disengage from the nation state as well as from these other identities.
Its interests extend across many different nations, races, religions, and
cultures and are transnational and supra-national, detached and disen-
gaged from--and actually hostile to--any particular place or group or
set of beliefs that supports particular identities.

Hence, the managerial elite has a proclivity toward as well as a
material interest in adopting and promoting ideologies of universal-
ism, egalitarianism, cultural relativism, behaviorism, and "blank slate"
environmental determinism. As Rieff writes:

If any group has embraced the rallying cry "Hey, hey, ho,
ho, Western culture's got to go," it is the world business
elite.. .for businessmen, something more is at stake than
ideas. Eurocentrism makes no economic sense in a world
where, within twenty-five years, the combined gross national
product of East Asia will likely be larger than Europe's and
twice that of the United States. In such a world, the notion
of the primacy of Western culture will only be an impedi-
ment to the chief goal of every company: the maximization
of profits.²³

Indeed, the social engineering and social reconstruction policies that
have always been closely associated with managerial structures in the
state, the economy, and the culture depend on ideological rationalizations
that seek to justify the idea that an innate human nature does not exist,
that sexual and racial differences are merely "social constructs" and
products of the social environment, and that scientifically informed
"management" can engineer both human society and human beings
themselves. As intellectual historian Donald Atwell Zoll wrote, the envi-
ronmentalist thesis,

at its simplest level, contended that (1) man's nature and his
subsequent behavior was largely, if not totally, determined by
his experiences in confronting his immediate environment; and
(2) prospects for improving human behavior, social relation-
ships, and society in general rested upon "reconstructions" and
modifications of his environment as the controlling factor....
On the one hand, the resources of social science were seen as
a response to more or less explicit social problems such as
crime, poverty, mental illness, or the reform of political insti-
tutions. In yet another context, social engineering saw as its
object the construction of a model society.²⁴

The projects of social reconstruction and social engineering required
the managerial and technical skills that the rising elite possessed as well
as the vastly increased scale and power of the state they were construct-
ing and controlling for the purpose of realizing these projects. The new
managerial elite therefore became closely wedded to the doctrine of
social environmentalism as a rationalization of its own role, power, and
social rewards in the system it constructed, and this powerful vested
interest in environmentalist theory by itself helps account for the per-
sistent strong attachment of the elite to the theory and its applications
in social policy.

Academic theorists of environmentalist doctrines such as Lester
Frank Ward, Charles Horton Cooley, John Dewey, Franz Boas and his
school in anthropology, and behaviorist John B. Watson in psychology
were essential ideological architects of the new managerial system of
social control. Watson in a famous remark boasted that if you gave
him an infant at birth, he could train him to become "any type of
specialist I might select--doctor, lawyer, artist, merchant-chief, and,
yes, even beggarman and thief, regardless of his talents, penchants,
tendencies, abilities, vocations, and race of his ancestors." ²⁵ By the
end of the 1920s, Watson's behaviorism, wrote sociologist E. Digby
Baltzell, "was not only the most fashionable school of psychology in
this country but also became the central theory of human nature upon
which the great industry of advertising was being built.... Faith
conditioning became the basis of social control in the new manipuli-
tive society, composed of citizen comrades in the U.S.S.R. and citizen
consumers in the U.S.A." ²⁶

Managerial reliance on what is now known to have been pseudosci-
ence in state-managed social engineering was paralleled in the manage-
rial economy through "industrial sociology" under the influence of Elton
Mayo and reflected, as Daniel Bell wrote, "a change in the outlook of
management, parallel to that which is occurring in the culture as a whole,
from authority to manipulation as a means of exercising dominion.. .the
older modes of overt coercion are now replaced by psychological per-
suasion." ²⁷ Watson himself, as historian Stuart Ewen noted:

provided psychological avenues by which home life might
be supplanted by the stimulation of the senses--a direction
toward which business in its advertising was increasingly
gravitating. Pleasure that could be achieved by the individual
within the home and community was attacked and deem-
phasized, as corporate enterprise formulated commoditized
sensual gratification.²⁸

The ideological reconstruction of American society to suit the needs
and interests of the emerging managerial class thus involved a repudia-
tion of the older values, codes, and belief-systems of the old elite and a
cultural conflict with those who continued to adhere to them. "Slowly
at first, but with increasing momentum in each decade after 1880,"
wrote Baltzell,

a naturalistic, urban, environmentalist, egalitarian, collectiv-
ist, and eventually Democratic ethic finally undermined the
Protestant, rural, hereditarian, opportunitarian, individualis-
tic, and Republican ethic which rationalized the Natural Right
of the old-stock business-gentleman's rule in America between
1860 and 1929.²⁹

The Agenda of Dispossession

The rise to power of the new managerial elite in the United States
(and in other Western states as well) in the early and mid-twentieth
century and the need of the new elite to formulate a new ideology
or political formula and reconstruct society around it provides an
explanation of why the dominant authorities in these countries today
continue to support the dispossession of whites and the cultural
and political destruction of the older American and Western civili-
zation centered on whites and of why they not only fail to resist
the anti-white demands of non-whites but actively support and
subsidize them. These policies on the part of the new elite are not
the result of "decadence" or "guilt" but of the group interests of the
elite itself, imbedded in and arising from the structure of their power
and position and rationalized in their consciousness by the political
formula of managerial liberalism. It is in the interests of the new elite,
in other words, to destroy and eradicate the older society and the
racial and cultural identities and consciousness associated with it (not
race alone, but also virtually any distinctive traditional group identity
or bond, cultural, biological, or political). To those ("conservatives")
who continue to adhere to the norms of the older society, of course,
managerial behavior appears as decadence, degeneracy, cowardice,
appeasement, pandering, or guilt, but what is an evil, misguided, or
suicidal pathology to the "conservative" forces who are still shaped
by the older codes and institutions in fact reflects the interest and the
health of the forces centered around the creation and control of the
new society. The interests of the managerial elite, in other words, are
antagonistic to the survival of the traditional racial and institutional
identity of the society it dominates.

The emergence of the managerial elite promotes the dispossession
and even the destruction of whites in the United States in two major
ways. First, as this essay has tried to argue, it does so directly because
the structure of managerial interests and power is in conflict with any
strong sense of racial as well as with strong national, religious, or other
group identity. These interests, entering into the very mentality of the
managerial class, push the leadership of the new society toward the
rejection of the racial and cultural fabric of traditional white Western
civilization, and the new culture they try to create is one that rejects and
denies the value of such identities and values.

Second, however, because the new managerial elite rejects and
destroys the mechanisms of the old elite that excluded other ethnic,
racial, and religious groups, such groups are often able to permeate the
managerial power structure and acquire levels of power unavailable
to them in pre-managerial society and to advance their own interests
and agendas by means of the managerial instruments of power. These
ethnic forces, articulating their own strong racial, ethnic, cultural, or
religious consciousness, invoke managerial liberal slogans of "equality."
"tolerance," "diversity," etc., to challenge traditional white dominance
but increasingly aspire to cultural and political supremacy themselves.
excluding whites and rejecting and dismantling the institutional fabric of
their society. Kevin MacDonald has documented in immense detail how
Jewish groups seeking to advance their own ethnically based agendas
have accomplished this,³⁰ and since a central part of those agendas
include the eradication of the historic ethnic, racial, and religious
barriers and beliefs that excluded Jews and were perceived as leading to
their persecution, the Jewish agenda and that of the managerial elite are
in this respect perfectly congruent with each other. Indeed, so prominent
have Jews become within the elite (especially its cultural sector) that it
is fair to say that Jews within the managerial elite serve as the cultural
vanguard of the managerial class, providing ideological justification of
its structure and policies, disseminating its ideological formulas to the
mass population, formulating and often implementing specific policies,
and providing much of the specialized educational training essential to
the transmission and perpetuation of the technocratic skills of the elite.
In this respect, Jews perform a support function (in this case, a cultural
and ideological one rather than tax-collecting or money-lending) for
the largely non-Jewish elite similar to those they performed for various
European aristocracies in the past (e.g., in early modern Poland). Thus the
emergence of "neo-conservatism" in recent decades reflects not only the
Jewish interests and identities of its principal formulators and exponents
but also, unlike the older conservatism of the pre-managerial elite, the
interests of the managerial class as a whole in conserving the new political
and cultural order that class has created but rejecting and dismantling the
pre-managerial order the older conservatism sought to defend.³¹

The managerial elite, however also has allied with other ethnic and
racial groups, most of which share its interest in eliminating white racial
identity and the cultural forces that support it. Like the Jewish allies of
the elite and the elite itself, these non-white groups seek to eradicate white
racial identity and its institutional expression, but unlike the elite, they also
often seek to promote their own racial consciousness and identity. Thus,
while explicitly white racial identity is virtually forbidden and strictly
punished by the managerial elite, institutions that reflect explicit non-
white or anti-white identities are tolerated and encouraged. Groups such
as the NAACP, the Congressional Black Caucus, the National Council
of La Raza ("The Race"), and any number of professional, student, and
political organizations, the names, membership, and agendas of which
are explicitly racial, are not only tolerated but are often the recipients of
millions of dollars in grants and philanthropy from the managerial state
and managerial corporations and foundations.

In effect, the alliance between racially conscious non-white forces
and the rising managerial elite in the last century represents a manage-
rial partnership with a historical process that originally was entirely
separate and different from the managerial revolution, what Lothrop
Stoddard called "The Rising Tide of Color," the emergence of racial
consciousness and identity and the political aspirations shaped by race
among the non-white peoples of the non-Western world and the sub-
ordinate non-white populations within the West. What Stoddard was
describing is virtually identical to the world-historical process that the
late sociologist and historian Robert A. Nisbet called the "racial revolu-
tion," the replacement by "color" of "nationality and economic class as
the major setting for revolutionary thrust, strategy, tactics, and also phi-
losophy." ³² While the new elite rejected "white racism" and all vestiges
of white racial and cultural identity and heritage in order to displace
its rivals in the older elite and to engineer and manage a new, cultur-
ally and racially homogenized global social order that reflected its own
interests, the non-white racial forces with which it allied rejected white
racial supremacy and identity in part to revolt against and overthrow
("liberate" themselves from) white domination (a phase of the racial
revolution generally called by the benign label of the "civil rights
movement") but in part also to pursue their own racial power and aspi-
rations. While for several decades there appeared to be a conjunction of
interests between the elite and its non-white allies in the elimination of
all racial identities and consciousness, today, as non-whites increasingly
assert their own racial identities, aspirations, and ambitions for powei
serious conflicts between the elite and non-white racial movements may
occur, and such conflicts may eventually destabilize the managerial elite
or even displace it from power as a new social force--non-white racial
consciousness and the energies it mobilizes--challenges the social force
of the managerial class. As historian Paul Gottfried comments, "Hispanic
racialists, Third World patriarchs, and Mexican irredentists will likely
eat up the present regime, if given the demographic chance." ³³

But there is little sign of an emerging white racial identity capable of
challenging either the managerial power structure, its anti-white univer-
salist ideology and agenda, or the direct racial threat whites face from
non-white and anti-white enemies. The new elite and its non-white allies
have weakened or destroyed the belief systems, moral values, cultural
legacies, and social bonds and institutions that made whites conscious
of who and what they are and sustained within them a determination to
survive and prevail. Until such mechanisms can be rebuilt, there appears
to be little prospect of whites overcoming or even adequately recognizing
the threats and challenges they face today, and those mechanisms cannot
be rebuilt as long as the managerial elite remains in power, as long as its
universalist and egalitarian ideology remains the dominant political and
cultural formula, and as long as the anti-white allies of the elite share
power with the elite. What whites must recognize, if they wish to survive
at all, is that the forces that have destroyed their civilization are the same
forces that rule its ruins and whose rule brought it to ruin. Not until those
forces are themselves displaced from power will the whites of the future
be able to recover the legacy their ancestors created and left for them.

ENDNOTES
1. Steven Greenhouse and Jonathan D. Glater, "Companies See Court
Ruling As Support for Diversity," New York Times, June 24, 2003.
2. Arthur Livingston, "Introduction," in Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class
(Elementi di Scienza Politica), ed. and rev, by Arthur Livingston, trans. by
Hannah D. Kahn (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1939), p. xix.
3. Mosca, The Ruling Class, p. 70.
4. Ibid.,p.71.
5. The definitive account remains Arthur 0. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of
Being: A Study of the History of an Idea (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1936). See also E.M.W. Tillyard, The Elizabethan World Picture
(New York: Macmillan, 1944) and Lawrence Stone, The Crisis of the
Aristocracy, 1558-1 640 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), chapter 3
passim, for its use by the ruling class of Elizabethan England.
6. James Burnham, The Machiavellians: Defenders of Freedom (New York:
John Day Company, 1943), pp. 9 1-92. This book remains probably the
best introduction to the classical theory of elites.
7. James H. Meisel, The Myth of the Ruling Class: Gaetano Mosca and
the "Elite" (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1962), p.
4. See also Geraint Parry, Political Elites (New York: Praegei 1970), pp.
31ff., for the "unity" of an elite.
8. Suzanne Kellei Beyond the Ruling Class: Strategic Elites in Modern
Society (New York: Random House, 1963), is a classic expression of the
theory of strategic elites. See also Arnold M. Rose, The Power Structure:
Political Process in American Society (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1967).
9. James Burnham, The Managerial Revolution: What Is Happening in
the World (1941; reprint ed., Bloomington, md.: University of Indiana
Press, 1960), p. 82.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid., p. 203; for the "technocracy" movement of Howard Scott, see
Daniel Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social
Forecasting (New York: Basic Books, 1973), p. 349, n. 8.
12. Alfred D. Chandlej Jr., The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution
in American Business (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), p.
584, n. 3, and p.491.
13. Geoffrey Barraclough, An Introduction to Contemporary History
(Baltimore, Md.: Penguin Books, 1964), pp. 50-5 1.
14. Thomas Ferguson, "Industrial Conflict and the Coming of the New
Deal: The Triumph of Multinational Liberalism in America," in Steve
Fraser and Gary Gerstie, eds., The Rise and Fall of the New Deal
Order, 1930-1980 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989),
p. 9. Ferguson sees the conflict over the New Deal as being centered in
Morgan (anti-Roosevelt) vs. Rockefeller (pro-Roosevelt) groups.
15. Burnham, Managerial Revolution, pp. 196ff.
16. The managerial need for uniformity might seem to contradict the
current cant about "diversity" and its benefits (usually unspecified), but
"diversity" is mainly a slogan for the eradication of white identity and is
seldom invoked to challenge non-white identity. "Diversity" as practiced
is thus entirely consistent with the uniformity of economic, cultural,
political, and psychological and personal mentality and behavior that
managerial hegemony demands and enforces.
17. David Rieff, "Multiculturaljsm's Silent Partnei" Harper's (August,
1993), pp. 66-67; Rieff of course approves of the phenomenon he is
describing.
18. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Between TwoAges:Amerjca `s Role in the Technetronic
Age (1970; reprint ed., New York: Penguin Books, 1976), p. 59.
19. Christopher Lasch, The Revolt of the Elites and the Betrayal of
Democracy (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995), pp. 34-35.
20. Samuel P. Huntington, Who Are We? The Cultural Core of American
National Identity (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004), pp. 267 and
263-72 passim.
21. Burnham, Managerial Revolution, p. 173.
22. Ibid., p. 181; "mistakenly" because Burnham at the time (1940) believed
Germany and Japan would be victorious in World War II. The existence
of such managerial regimes as those of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan
and their use of ideologies of extreme racial hegemony and national-
ism suggests that not all forms of managerial dominance are necessarily
wedded to ideologies of universalism, egalitarianism, and environmental-
ist determinism. But of course Germany and Japan lost the war, and the
form of managerial power they represented did not survive, raising the
possibility that their brief existence may have been merely an anomaly.
23. Rieff, Harper's, pp. 68-69; "maximization of profits" may be the major
specific goal of corporate managers, but for the elite in general the
major consideration, as with any ruling class, is perpetuation of power
and position.
24. Donald Atwell Zoll, Twentieth Century Political Philosophy (Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974), p. 80.
25. Quoted in Steven Pinker, The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human
Nature (New York: Viking, 2002), p. 19. This book helps expose the ide-
ological and pseudoscientific roots of environmentalist theory. See also
Carl N. Degler, In Search of Human Nature: The Decline and Revival of
Darwinism in American Social Thought (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1991), especially chapter 8, for the political and ideological moti-
vations of environmentalist social theory.
26. E. Digby Baltzell, The Protestant Establishment: Aristocracy and Caste
in America (New York: Random House, 1964), p. 270.
27. Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1960),
p. 244.
28. Stuart Ewen, Captains of Consciousness: Advertising and the Social
Roots of the Consumer Culture (New York: McGraw-Hill Book
Company, 1976), p. 83.
29. Baltzell, The Protestant Establishment, p. 158.
30. Kevin MacDonald, A People That Shall Dwell Alone: Judaism As a
Group Evolutionary Strategy, Separation and Its Discontents: Tou'arI
an Evolutionary Theory of Anti-Semitism, and The Culture of Critique:
An Evolutionary Analysis of Jewish Involvement in Twentieth-Centun,
Intellectual and Political Movements (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1994,
1998, and 1998), especially the last volume. The first volume, chapter 5
and pp. 121-123, discusses the alliance between Ashkenazi Jews and
the early modern Polish nobility, and see also MacDonald's essay in this
volume; see also Benjamin Ginsberg, The Fatal Embrace: Jews and the
State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), pp. 11ff. for similar
Jewish-gentile elite alliances.
31. On the managerial functions of neo-conservatism see my essay
"Neoconservatism and the Managerial Revolution," in Samuel Francis,
Beautiful Losers: Essays on the Failure of American Conservatism
(Columbia, Mo.: University of Missouri Press, 1993), pp. 95-117. In
recent years, neo-conservatives have tended to reflect Jewish and Zionist
interests far more than they do the general interests of the managerial
class.
32. Robert Nisbet, The Social Philosophers: Community and Conflict in
Western Thought (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1973), p. 306.
33. Paul Edward Gottfried, Multiculturalism and the Politics of Guilt:
Toward a Secular Theocracy (Columbia, Mo.: University of Missouri
Press, 2002), p. 147.